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ATTORNEY BEWARE-THE PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE
INFLUENCE AND THE ATrORNEY-BENEFICIARY
I. Introduction
Since ancient times suspicion has been directed toward attorneys and toward
anyone who drafted a will under which he received a gift. Plato remarked that
lawyers had an "evil reputation,"' and under Roman law, a legacy to one who
drew a will was invalid.2 Despite the high standards set for attorneys, and a
tendency for modern Anglo-American law to treat such legacies less severely, 3 the
suspicions persist. In light of these attitudes, one would expect that an attorney
would be extremely hesitant to draft a will naming himself as a beneficiary. Yet
cases continue to arise where an attorney has drafted such a will and the courts
have raised a presumption or inference that the will was procured through the
exertion of undue influence. To rebut this presumption the attorney is faced with
the burden of showing that the testator knew the contents of the will and acted
according to his own desires.4
Most jurisdictions agree that undue influence is a moral or physical coercion
which prevents the testator from exercising his free will, thereby destroying his
free agency and substituting the judgment of another.5 There is, however, little
agreement as to what circumstances will give rise to a presumption or inference
of undue influence. It is perhaps this disagreement among jurisdictions, and even
within the same jurisdiction, that has continually led attorneys to draft wills under
which they receive a benefit. While no general rule can be set down which would
cover all states, it is hoped that this analysis of the positions taken by most
jurisdictions will alert attorneys to the danger of drafting such a will.
II. Mere Confidential Relationship
Although most courts require more than the mere existence of a confidential
relationship between testator and beneficiary to raise a presumption of undue
influence, some courts have indicated that certain such relationships are sufficient
in themselves. In Re Anderson's Estate,7 involved a devise of property by the
bk. XI (B. Jowett 1920).

I

PLATO, LAws,

2
3

JUSTINIAN DIoEsT, bk. XLVIII, tit. 10, 15.
3 PAGE ON WILLS § 29.95 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961).

4

"Proof of the execution of the will and that the deceased was of testable capacity, is not

sufficient; but there must be affirmative, plenary evidence that he had knowledge of its contents
and fully and freely sanctioned them." (Footnote omitted.) R. PRITGHARD, LAW oF WILLS AND
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES § 140 (H. Phillips ed. 1955).

5 1 PAGE ON WILLS § 15.2 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1960). For a comparison of the legal and
psychological approaches to undue influence see Shaffer, Undue Influence, Confidential Relationships, and the Psychology of Transference, 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 197 (1970).
6 Some decisions flatly deny that a confidential relationship alone will raise the presumption. See, e.g., Burke v. Thomas, 282 Ala. 412, 211 So. 2d 903 (1968); In Re Estate of
Niquette, 264 Cal. App. 2d 976, 71 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1968); Gehm v. Brown, 125 Colo. 555, 245
P.2d 865 (1952); Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175 P.2d 692 (1946); In Re Polly's
Estate, 174 Neb. 222, 117 N.W.2d 375 (1962); In Re Davis' Will, 14 N.J. 166, 101 A.2d 521
(1953); In Re Roblin's Estate, 210 Ore. 371, 311 P.2d 459 (1957); In Re Draper's Estate,
374 P.2d 425 (Wyo. 1962).

7 142 Okla. 197, 286 P.17 (1929).
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testator to his attorney"-a friend and adviser for many years. The Supreme Court
of Oklahoma ruled that the burden of showing that the will was not obtained
through undue influence was on the attorney-beneficiary acting as proponent,
even though he had not drafted the will. It was, however, unnecessary for the
court to base its ruling solely on the confidential relationship because the testator's
drug addiction provided an additional suspicious circumstance upon which to
base the presumption.
Fifteen years later, the same court, in In Re Harjoche'sEstate,' quoting the
Anderson decision with approval, declared:
Where a person devises his property to one who is acting during that
time as his attorney, either in relation to the subject matter of making the
will, or generally, such devise of itself raises a presumption of undue influence.9
Again, however, the statement appears as dicta because the attorney had actually
drafted the will and was the principal beneficiary. In recent years the Oklahoma
courts have retreated from this broad application of the presumption. In In Re
Estate of Newkirk," though admittedly not faced with an attorney-beneficiary
situation, the court limited the application of the Harjoche case by indicating that
the presence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship would not, standing alone,
necessarily raise the presumption.
Connecticut decisions show a trend similar to that taken by the Oklahoma
courts, but arrive at a much stricter rule than that followed in most jurisdictions.11
Finding error in the lower court instruction that in order to raise the presumption
the jury must find that the beneficiary was active in procuring the will, the court
in Appeal of Kirby 2 said that a prima facie presumption of undue influence arose
out of a confidential relationship between testator and beneficiary regardless of
whether or not the beneficiary actually took part in the execution of the will.
In a subsequent decision, 3 Connecticut modified this approach by declaring
that, in addition to the confidential relationship, the beneficiary sustaining sucl4
relationship should be a principal beneficiary and the bequest should exclude the
natural objects of the testator's bounty to raise the presumption. While this rule
still requires no activity on the part of the beneficiary, it does adopt the additional
requirement that the disposition be unnatural under the circumstances.
The New York court in In Re Smith's Will 4 discerned that state's rule as
raising an inference of undue influence from the mere fact of benefit to one
standing in an attorney-client relationship. Again, however, the broad rule was
unnecessary as the attorney not only drafted the will but was the principal beneficiary. Other New York cases did not follow this strict rule and it seems clear
that in that jurisdiction an attorney who sends his client to another attorney to
8 193 Okla. 631, 146 P.2d 130 (1944).
9 Id. at 132.
10 456 P.2d 104 (Okla. 1969).

11 Comment, 44 M~AQ. L. Rxv. 570 (1961).
12 91 Conn. 40, 98 A. 349 (1916).
13 Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 147 Conn. 474, 162 A.2d 709 (1960).
14 170 Misc. 572, 10N.Y.S.2d 775 (1939).
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draft a will favorable to the former need not worry about the presumption of
undue influence arising solely from the professional relationship."
The adoption of the broad rule noted in these earlier decisions appears to
have been motivated by an attempt to follow the rule applicable to gifts inter
vivos under similar circumstances. The Maryland Court in Cook v.Hollyday'
refused to apply the inter vivos rule noting that there is an obvious difference
between the gift which strips the donor of its use while he is living and the
bequest taking effect upon the testator's death. Some of the problems generated
by this approach are illustrated by an examination of two Indiana decisions. In
Willett v.Hall" the court, refusing to apply the rule applicable to gifts inter vivos,
said that one's status as a friend and faithful servant of the testator should not
render him incapable of taking a devise. To the contrary, the court thought such
circumstances should increase the presumption in favor of the will and not against
it. Yet four years later, the same court saw no reason why the inter vivos rule
should not be applied. 8 Nevertheless, the rule arrived at in this latter case did
not raise the presumption on the basis of the confidential relationship alone but
required, in addition, some activity in preparing and executing the will.
III. Confidential Relationship Plus Activity
The vast majority of courts that have been confronted with this question
have required something more than a confidential relationship between testator
and beneficiary to raise a presumption that the document was procured through
the exercise of undue influence. Though these additional requirements vary from
state to state, most necessitate an unnatural disposition of the testator's estate and
some active participation by the beneficiary in the execution or preparation of the
will.' 9 Some variations require that the person benefited be a "favored"' 0 or
principal beneficiary, but the result is substantially the same. The Florida rule
provides a good model of this three-pronged approach. In order to raise the
presumption under Florida law, the contestant must show: (1) a confidential
relationship between testator and beneficiary; (2) an active part taken by the
beneficiary in procuring the document; and (3) a substantial benefit conferred
on the beneficiary by the document."'
The second of these elements has given rise to a good deal of the litigation
on the subject. While no clear-cut line can be drawn indicating what degree of
activity will constitute active procurement, it is clear that where an attorney
15 In Re Putnam's Will, 257 N.Y. 140, 177 N.E. 399 (1931).
16 185 Md.656, 45 A.2d 761 (1946).
17 220 Ind. 310, 41 N.E.2d 619 (1942).
18 Sweeney v.Vierbuchen, 224 Ind. 341, 66 N.E.2d 764 (1946).
19 E.g., Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1969); McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C.
178, 25 S.E.2d 615 (1943); In Re Estate of Hobelsberger, 181 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1970);
Oglesby v. Harris, 130 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); In Re Estate of Smith, 68 Wash. 2d
145, 411 P.2d 879 (1966).
20 "One who, in the circumstances of the particular case, has been favored over others
having equal claim to the testator's bounty. An unnatural discrimination, leading to a natural
inference that advantage has been taken by one in position so to do; and shown to have been
busy in getting such will executed." Cook v. Morton, 241 Ala. 181, 1 So. 2d 890, 892 (1941).
21 1 D. REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN FLORIDA, § 5.08 (1969); In Re
Aldrich's Estate, 148 Fla. 121, 3 So. 2d 856 (1941) (Brown, C. J. concurring).
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prepares a will for a client devising a substantial legacy to himself and the bulk
of the estate to his mother, a presumption is raised.22
Even where an attorney does not draft the will but asks a close associate to
act as scrivener, it has been held that the presumption is raised.2" There is, however, authority to the contrary and it would appear that where the beneficiary's
24
activity is solely pursuant to the testator's instructions, no presumption is raised.
Still, the situation may be regarded with suspicion and additional activity, such as
the procurement of witnesses, may tip the scale in favor of the presumption.25
California, while following the three-pronged approach, apparently does not
recognize the exception espoused by other jurisdictions that there is no presumption raised where the draftee-beneficiary merely writes what he is told to write.
In In Re Estate of Peters,26 testatrix requested a confidant to draft a will which
provided him with a legacy. Despite the beneficiary's admonition to wait, testatrix insisted he draft the will after finding that her attorney was unavailable.
Noting that the beneficiary would have received nothing had there been no will,
the court held that he had unduly profited. The confidential relationship, undue
profit, and the beneficiary's activity in preparing the will gave rise to a presumption of undue influence.
New York has often taken the position that no presumption is raised when
an attorney drafts a will which makes him a beneficiary. The attorney is, of
course, given the duty of explaining the situation. 7 Later decisions indicate that
if his explanation is unsatisfactory a rebuttable inference of undue influence is
raised.28 In In Re Moskowitz' Will,29 the attorney-beneficiary was the testator's
son. He drafted a will for his father which excluded the testator's daughter and
divided the estate equally between himself and another son. The court, apparently recognizing that the devise was not unnatural, refused to raise an inference of undue influence. Wisconsin also adheres to this position. Where a
lawyer drafts a will for his wife, children or parents, no presumption or inference
is raised. The rationale is that such relations are natural objects of testator's
bounty and, if the proposed legacy is no more than would be received under the
law, there is no tendency for such an occurrence to be looked upon with suspicion.20
Several other courts have taken a position similar to that expressed by New
York in hesitating to raise a presumption of undue influence. The Supreme
Court of Iowa in Olsen v. Corporationof New Melleray3 ' observed:
22 In Re Malone's Will, 22 Fla. Supp. 101, aff'd, 167 So. 2d 759 (Fla. App. 1964), cert.
denied, 174 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1965).
23 In Re Reid's Estate, 138 So. 2d 342 (Fla. App. 1962).
24 1 D. REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN FLORIDA, § 5.08 (1969); see In Re
Smith, 212 So. 2d 74 (Fla. App. 1968); Mindler v. Crocker, 245 Ala. 578, 18 So. 2d 278
(1944); In Re Peterson's Estate, 77 Nev. 87, 360 P.2d 259 (1961); Toombs v. Matthesen, 206
Okla. 1139, 241 P.2d 937 (1952); Hubbell v. Houston, 441 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1968).
25 In Re Estate of MacPhee, 187 So. 2d 679 (Fla. App. 1966).
26 9 Cal. App. 3d 916, 88 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1970).
27 In Re Cotter's Estate, 180 Misc. 399, 40 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1943); In Re Putnam's Will, 257

N.Y. 140, 177 N.E. 399 (1931).

28 In Re Estate of Hayes, 49 Misc. 2d 152, 267 N.Y.S.2d 452 '(1966).
29 107 N.Y.S.2d 853, 279 App. Div. 660, aff'd, 303 N.Y. 992, 106 N.E.2d 68, motion

denied, 304 N.Y. 593, 107 N.E.2d 84 (1951).
30

31

State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).

245 Iowa 407, 60 N.W.2d 832 (1953).
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All that can be said is that the existence of a confidential relation, such as
...attorney and client ... affords peculiar opportunities for unduly exercising influence over the mind, and where the dominant party, in such relation,
initiates the preparation of the will or gives directions as to its contents to the
scrivener or writes it himself, in other words, is active either in its preparation
or execution, and is made a beneficiary thereunder, a suspicion arises that the
of undue influence over the
benefaction may have resulted from the exertion
2
testator rather than from his free volition.1
But the court noted that if the legacy was large, compared to the total value of
the estate, an inference might be raised. Likewise, the Massachusetts courts will
regard such circumstances with scrutiny and the jury will be warranted in investigating the circumstances. 3
Although most courts refuse to raise the presumption solely on the basis of
the attorney-client relationship, participation in drafting is not the only activity
that will give rise to such a presumption. Such activity is only one of many
factors that some courts refer to as suspicious circumstances. This approach
provides more flexibility and allows the court to raise a presumption or inference
of undue influence whenever suspicious circumstances surround a legacy to a
confidant of the testator. In In Re Estate of Komarr,3 4 the attorney-beneficiary's
retention of another attorney to draft the will, testatrix' weakened condition, and
the failure to contact testatrix' only son and sole heir were sufficient to raise the
presumption of undue influence even though the beneficiary had not drafted the
will and was not present at its execution.
Other courts, while following the basic three-pronged approach, have required additional circumstances to give rise to a presumption or inference of
undue influence. In this regard, Pennsylvania has taken the approach that even
where the attorney-beneficiary drafts the will, no presumption is raised unless it
is also shown that the testator had a weakened intellect.3 It is interesting to note
that Virginia, while once adhering to the Massachusetts view that no presumption
arises," subsequently held that the burden on the issue of undue influence is on
the proponent of the will if, in addition, it is shown that the testator was sick or
had a weak mind and was inclined to yield readily to persuasion."
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has taken a different approach to the
testator's weakened intellect. In In Re Draper'sEstate,8 that court held that a
confidential relationship would not raise a presumption,
32 Id. at 836.
33 Mooney v. McKenzie, 324 Mass. 685, 88 N.E.2d 546 (1949); Reilly v. McAuliffe, 331
Mass. 144, 117 N.E.2d 811 (1954). See also Tomkins v. Tomkins, 1 Bailey 92, 19 Am. Dec.
656 (S.C. 1828); Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1954).
34 46 Wis.2d 230, 175 N.W.2d 473 (1970); accord, In Re Burt's Estate, 122 Vt. 260, 169
A.2d 32 (1961).
35 In Re Gold's Estate, 408 Pa. 41, 182 A.2d 707 (1962). The attorney here did not draft
the will, but the court viewed his activity in taking down testator's instructions and relaying
them to another attorney for drafting as if the beneficiary had drafted the will.
36 Riddell & Als. v. Johnson's Ex'or & Als., 26 Gratt. 152, 67 Va. 60 (1875).
37 Redford v. Booker, 166 Va. 561, 185 S.E. 879 (1936); Croft v. Snidow, 183 Va. 649,
33 S.E.2d 208 (1945); accord, Kiefer's Ex'r and Ex'x v. Deibel, 292 Ky. 318, 166 S.W.2d 430
(1942); Hollon's Executor v. Graham, 280 S.W.2d 544 (Ky. App. 1955); Frye v. Norton, 148
W.Va. 500, 135 S.E.2d 603 (1964).
38 374 P.2d 425 (Wyo. 1962).

NOTES
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• . . unless in addition to such relationship there existed suspicious circumstances such as the beneficiary taking part in the preparation or procuring of
the will or actually drafting or assisting in its execution or that the testator
was weakminded, in frail health, and particularly susceptible to influence or
that the provisions of the will were unnatural and unjust. (Emphasis
added.)8 9
Under this analysis, the presumption could be raised not only by the additional
circumstance of a weakened intellect, but also where the only factors were a confidential relationship and a weakened intellect.
Arizona, while following the majority approach,4" has so construed the presumption that it would appear to be of little or no value. In In Re Pitt'sEstate,'
the court said that any presumption dissolves whenever the person charged with
exerting the influence denies such action. It can hardly be expected that one who
is guilty of such conduct will readily admit to it, and the effect of the Pitt
decision is to require the contestant to carry the burden regardless of his ability
to show facts which admittedly raise the presumption.
Some courts, though requiring more than a confidential relationship, have
42
Condeclined to require that a person benefited be a principal beneficiary.
versely, it has been held that where the attorney drafting the will received a gift of
slight value' or is named only as trustee or executor," no presumption is raised.
Notwithstanding the above, where attorneys named as trustees and executors are
given a great deal of control over the proceeds of the estate and will receive a
large compensation for services, the benefit may be deemed substantial enough to
give rise to the presumption.4 5
IV. Statutory Provisions
While most states have statutes establishing probate procedures and allocating the burden of proof for the initial proving of the will, only a few deal specifically with a presumption of undue influence. The Kansas statute squarely meets
the problem by creating a statutory presumption of undue influence in providing:
If it shall appear that any will was written or prepared by the sole or
principal beneficiary in such will, who, at the time of writing or preparing
the same, was the confidential agent or legal adviser of the testator, or who
occupied at the time any other position of confidence or trust to such testator, such will shall not be held to be valid unless it shall affirmatively appear
contents of such will, and had inthat the testator had read or knew the 46
dependent advice with reference thereto.
39 Id. at 430.

40 In Re Thompson's Estate, 1 Ariz. App. 18, 398 P.2d 926 (1965).

41 88 Ariz. 312, 356 P.2d 408 (1960).
42 Orr v. Love, 225 Ark. 505, 283 S.W.2d, 667 (1955); In Re Will of Moses, 227 So. 2d
829 '(Miss. 1969); Cline v. Larson, 234 Ore. 384, 383 P.2d 74 (1963); Hummer v. Betenbough, 75 N.M. 274, 404 P.2d 110 (1965) (citing Cline v. Larson).
43 Trubey v. Richardson, 224 Il1. 136, 79 N.E. 592 (1906).
44 Brown v. Commercial National Bank of Peoria, 42 Ill. 2d 365, 247 N.E.2d 894, cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 961, reh. denied, 396 U.S. 1047 (1969); Estate of Vollbrecht v. Pace, 26
Mich. App. 430, 182 N.W.2d 609 (1970).
45 In Re Estate of Nelson, 232 So. 2d 222 (Fla. App. 1970).
46

KAz;. STAT. AN;. § 59-605 (1964).
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Georgia, though requiring less proof, takes the same approach through its
statute:
In all cases, a knowledge of the contents of the paper by the testator shall be
necessary to its validity; but usually, where a testator can read and write, his
signature, or the acknowledgement of his signature, shall be sufficient. If,
however, the scrivener or his immediate relations are large beneficiaries under
the will, greater proof shall be necessary to show a knowledge of the contents
by the testator.47
The effect of this statute is to leave the initial burden of proof with the proponent
of the will if the stated circumstances exist rather than providing for an initial
proving which switches the burden to the contestant to show circumstances raising
the presumption. Despite the provisions of the statute, the Supreme Court of
Georgia in White v. Irwin" declared that no presumption of undue influence can
arise because one occupying a confidential relationship with the testator is active
in drafting a will in which he is made a beneficiary. In holding that the extra
burden had been met, the court noted that the beneficiary had written only what
testatrix desired, using memoranda she had prepared.
On its face, the Louisiana statute49 does not apply to attorneys, but it has
been construed to apply to the keeper of a boardinghouse where the deceased
was staying prior to death. The court held that although such a person was not
within the letter of the statute, he was within its spirit.5" By the same reasoning,
an attorney who attended a person under the same circumstances could be held
to be within the spirit of the statute. The thrust of this statute is quite different in
that it raises a total bar to persons within the statute's purview, rather than
requiring any special proof of testator's freedom of choice.
V. No Presumption
Some jurisdictions have refused to raise a presumption of undue influence,
reasoning that all the circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of
a will should be considered by the trier of fact. If the circumstances warrant,
the trier of fact would be justified in finding that undue influence was exerted. 5
Following this view, the court in Cook v. Hollyday 2 noted that while there is a
presumption of undue influence in gifts inter vivos between attorney and client, no
47 GA. CODE ANN. § 113-305 (1959).
48 220 Ga. 836, 142 S.E.2d 255 (1965).
49 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1489 (West 1952) provides:
Doctors of physic or surgeons, who have professionally attended a person during
the sickness of which he dies, can not receive any benefit from donations inter vivos or
mortis causa made in their favor by the sick person during that sickness. To this,
however, there are the following exceptions:
1. Remunerative dispositions made on a particular account, regard being had to
the means of the disposer and to the services rendered.
2. Universal dispositions in case of consanguinity. The same rules are observed with
regard to ministers of religious worship.
50 Cormeier v. Myers, 223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953).
51 See Cave v. McLean, 66 Ohio App. 196, 32 N.E.2d 581 (1939); Carpenter v. Hatch,
64 N.H. 573, 15 A. 219 (1888); Barton v. Beck's Estate, 159 Me. 446, 195 A.2d 63 (1963).
52 185 Md. 656, 45 A.2d 761 (1946).
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such presumption exists in the case of a gift under a will. Continuing, the court
said:
[T]here is an obvious difference between a gift whereby the donor strips
himself of the enjoyment of his property while living and a gift by will,
which takes effect only from the death of the testator.5"
Similarly, the Montana court, in In Re Cocanougher's Estate,"' specifically rejected the California rule that raises the presumption on a showing of a confidential relationship, active participation, and undue profit.
VI. Disciplinary Action
Notwithstanding the disservice an attorney does his client by creating a situation where the presumption of undue influence may defeat the will, he leaves
himself open for possible disciplinary action for unethical practice.
In State v. Horan,55 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was called upon to
consider possible disciplinary action against an attorney who had drafted six wills
for a client. Each succeeding will provided for a larger bequest to the attorney.
The last will was refused probate but the attorney still received over $38,000
under the fifth will. The court limited its action to a reprimand and costs due
to the lack of definition and possible misunderstanding on the part of the legal
profession but noted that the attorney had failed to recognize the conflict of
interest between his position as an attorney and his position as a beneficiary. He
placed himself in a position where he might be rendered unable to give disinterested advice and took no steps to insure that the will would withstand
objections. The court maintained that:
He should have insisted that a disinterested attorney of the client's own
choosing be engaged to draft the will if he wanted to become a beneficiary
of such a substantial amount under the will .... 56
Even after this warning the same court was forced to consider the question again
when an attorney drew a will for his uncle which disinherited the testator's
daughter and, estranged wife leaving everything to the attorney's mother. While
the court noted that the inference of undue influence had been overcome on the
contest of probate, it said that it was the lawyer's duty to his client and to the
legal profession to avoid action which would raise that inference in the first
place. The defendant was reprimanded and ordered to pay $1,750 costs and fees.
The -California State Bar recommended a two-year suspension for an attorney who drafted a will for an elderly client which provided a $21,000 legacy
to the attorney. On petition, the Supreme Court of California 7 found that an attorney who had acted as witness had, on his own initiative, questioned testatrix
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 765.
141 Mont. 16, 375 P.2d 1009 (1962).
21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
Id. at 491.
Bodisco v. State Bar of California, 58 Cal. 2d 495, 374 P.2d 803 (1962).
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and was satisfied that the bequest was in accord with her desires. This, and the
fact that testatrix had no relatives, led the court to dismiss the disciplinary proceeding. Although the evidence provided was insufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence in the probate court, it was sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt as to the charge that petitioner had exercised undue influence.
VII. Conclusion
In retrospect, the foregoing approaches do not appear to be systematically
developed rules which can be applied to all attorney-beneficiary situations. They
are rather products of the particular fact situations with which the various courts
have been faced. While some approaches seem more structured than others,
most jurisdictions require that all circumstances surrounding the preparation and
execution of a will be examined to insure that it was an expression of the
testator's true intent. All that can be said of those states that form a more structured rule is that certain circumstances are looked upon with greater care and
scrutiny than others, but all unusual or suspicious circumstances will be examined. Some courts feel that where these circumstances lead to a natural suspicion that the will was produced through undue influence, an inference or
presumption with varying degrees of probative value will be raised. Others
refuse to raise a presumption or switch the burden of proof to the proponent,
but leave the question to the discretion of the trier of fact.
Because of the many different circumstances that surround the drafting and
execution of wills, it is difficult to choose one approach that is adequate to cover
all situations. For this reason, the courts should strive to maintain flexibility. If
rules are set down that require specific elements and exclude others, many suspicious circumstances will escape the courts' scrutiny. In addition, any strict rule
necessarily overlooks situations where an attorney finds it necessary to draft a
will for his client regardless of the will's bequest to the scrivener. Notwithstanding
the difficult position facing an attorney, such strict approaches may also restrict
the testator's free choice.
On the other hand, a rule which is too loosely defined perpetuates the already
too prevalent uncertainty and confusion concerning when or if an attorneybeneficiary may act as draftsman. Jurisdictions which fail to raise any presumption or inference arrive at an equally unfavorable result by apparently overlooking
the extremely difficult burden a contestant faces when he is required to construct
a prima facie case of undue influence.
The approach suggested by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v.
Horan" appears to strike a position which meets most of the objections to the
other approaches. The Wisconsin approach allows an attorney to draft wills for
the members of his immediate family when a devise to the attorney will not be, or
appear to be, unnatural. In other situations, if any circumstances are present
which appear suspicious or unnatural, an inference will be raised. The court does
not overlook the possibility that situations may arise where an attorney is forced
to draft a will under suspicious circumstances. In such cases, the inference will
58

21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
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be raised, but the court provides that if the attorney has adequately explained to
his client the dangers inherent in drafting such a will and is careful to ensure that
there is adequate independent evidence to explain his actions, the presumption
will be rebutted.
While this treatment of a will which provides a gift to the attorney-draftsman
puts the burden on the attorney who caused a suspicion to arise, it still does not
recognize the extremely difficult situation faced by one who is -confronted with
either proving or disproving undue influence. The drafting and execution of a
will is, quite naturally, a confidential procedure, and this confidence makes
illumination of the circumstances peculiarly difficult. If instead of raising the
presumption where any peculiar circumstances appear, the attorney is required to
show that the testator obtained independent advice, the presumption and its
difficult burden could be avoided. This approach provides a rigid procedure for
the attorney in those unusual circumstances where he finds it necessary to draft a
will favorable to himself without raising a presumption or inference of undue
influence. If the attorney is unable to show that he followed this procedure then
a presumption of undue influence should be raised.
Regardless of the approach, it is evident that an attorney does his client, the
legal profession, and himself a great disservice when, under any but the most unusual and extraordinary circumstances, he drafts a will which makes him a
beneficiary. Some states do not recognize the rule of partial invalidity of wills"
and the inability to overcome a presumption of undue influence renders the
entire will invalid, thereby defeating the testator's desires. Whenever an attorney
drafts a will under circumstances which may give rise to a presumption of undue
influence, he is not acting in the best interests of his client. He is starting off with
a deficit which is, at very least, imprudent.
Canon Nine of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility provides, in part:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty . . . to conduct himself so as to reflect
credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and
trust of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but the appearance of impropriety.0 (Emphasis added.)
More particularly Canon Five provides:
Other than in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to make him beneficiary be prepared by
another lawyer selected by the client.61
The legal profession, to maintain its effectiveness, must and does demand of its
members a standard of conduct far more stringent than most professions. An
attorney who acts in such a manner as to raise a presumption of undue influence
not only fails to live up to this standard, but violates the Canons of Professional
Ethics62 and lends weight to Plato's observation'of the reputation of attorneys.
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Unless practices which raise a presumption of undue influence are discontinued, it is not unreasonable to expect that more states will enact statutes
restricting the capacity of certain classes of persons to receive a bequest with the
corresponding restriction of testamentary free choice.
In addition to severe damage to his professional reputation and the reputation of the legal profession in general, the attorney who acts so as to raise the
presumption risks disciplinary action which may lead to a suspension from his
practice. The inconvenience of asking one's client to seek another attorney is
rendered minute when compared to the enormous repercussions which can follow
the failure to so act.
Harry S. Raleigh, Jr.

